Security Council Briefing on Darfur and the ICC

Subject
ICC Deputy Prosecutor's 43rd report under Resolution 1593 (Sudan / Darfur); Security Council 10,197th meeting (S/PV.10197)
Date
15 July 2026
Speakers
17 (ICC Deputy Prosecutor + 15 Council members + Sudan, invited under Rule 37)
Chair
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Council President)

How this was made — methodology

Source note. This readout is built from the UN transcripts.un.org automatic-speech-recognition (ASR) preview transcript, not an official UN record. The 9 position-critical quotes below were checked against the meeting audio (UN Web TV recording, English channel) on 16 July 2026, and a further 20 quotes from the scoring evidence behind the fault-line plot were checked on 29 July 2026; all 29 match the recording. Every remaining quote in the evidence panel is verbatim from the ASR transcript but has not been individually audio-checked. Sudanese place names (El Fasher, El Geneina, El Obeid) and personal names have been normalised to standard English spellings; the ASR mangles them.
Executive Summary

ICC Deputy Prosecutor Najat Shamim Khan briefed the Council remotely on the Office of the Prosecutor's 43rd report under Resolution 1593, reporting a "paradigm shift" in the Darfur investigation: interviews of key witnesses now draw a direct link between recent crimes in El Fasher and El Geneina and high-level perpetrators, and the Office warns — jointly with the UN human-rights office — that the "most serious international crimes may be about to take place" in El Obeid. Nominally a report on Darfur atrocities, the meeting's real fault line was the legitimacy of the International Criminal Court itself.

The defining divide is whether the ICC should be defended and expanded, or delegitimised and removed from Sudan. In practice it breaks down like this:

  • Defend the Court — Denmark, France, UK, Greece, Latvia, Panama, Colombia, Liberia + the chair (DRC): cooperation is "an obligation, not an option"; several (Denmark, France) want the ICC mandate expanded to all of Sudan.
  • Delegitimise / withdraw the file — the United States and Russia: the US calls the ICC an "intolerable threat" it is running a campaign to "dismantle"; Russia calls it a "Hague pseudo-court" and demands the Darfur (and Libya) files be withdrawn.
  • Sovereignty middle — China, Pakistan, Bahrain, Somalia: back accountability but stress Sudanese-led justice, complementarity and "no undue expansion" of the mandate.
  • The invited party (Sudan) — inverts the usual host-state stance: presses the ICC to move faster, issue RSF arrest warrants, and extend investigations to the UAE ("Abu Dhabi regime") as financier.

Colour key — a delegation's colour follows its name through the whole page and matches its dot in the plot: Defend the Court Sovereignty middle Delegitimise African / regional Sudan (invited party) ICC / briefer

What the Deputy Prosecutor Reported

Khan briefed from eastern Chad, having just met displaced Darfuris in refugee camps. Her report set out concrete investigative progress alongside stark early warning:

  • A "breakthrough." Crucial witness interviews now "draw a direct link between recent crimes committed in Darfur to high-level perpetrators"; the Office has "secured vital evidence" to hold "senior contributors to attacks to account." She stressed regulations bar her from naming any pending arrest applications.
  • El Obeid early warning. The Office is "united with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights" that "the most serious international crimes may be about to take place in El Obeid" — "we cannot say we did not know" (full quote below).
  • Evidence base. Over 130 interviews of victims plus satellite imagery, documentary, audiovisual and digital material; strengthened findings that war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed in both El Geneina and El Fasher.
  • The Ali Kushayb milestone. The conviction and sentencing of Ali Abd-Al-Rahman ("Ali Kushayb") for war crimes and crimes against humanity; reparations proceedings now under way, with a call for contributions to the ICC Trust Fund for Victims.
  • Cooperation, uneven. The Government of Sudan's cooperation is "on a positive trajectory" (team deployed to Port Sudan); the RSF has provided none — "a clear violation of the terms of Security Council Resolution 1593."
  • Headwinds. No access to Darfur territory; significant witness-protection needs; and — pointedly — "the coercive actions taken against the ICC do have an impact on our operations."
  • Procedural note. An application to withdraw charges against Abdallah Banda, to be addressed in a status conference the following week.
Areas of Consensus

Cutting across the camps — including several who otherwise clash sharply over the Court:

  • El Obeid must not become another El Fasher. Near-universal — Denmark, UK ("on the precipice of an atrocity"), France, Greece, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan and the briefer all name the imminent risk and demand civilian protection and safe passage.
  • Sexual and gender-based violence and crimes against children must be prioritised. Named by almost every delegation as a specific investigative and prosecutorial focus.
  • The Ali Kushayb conviction is a milestone; reparations must follow. Broad support for the Trust Fund for Victims, including from states that referred the situation in 2005.
  • The RSF's total non-cooperation violates Resolution 1593. Stated across camps; even sovereignty-minded delegations single out the RSF.
  • External support is prolonging the war and must stop. Widely shared in the abstract (US, France, Denmark, Pakistan) — though who is named breaks along a fault line (below).
  • The enforcement record is thin. Universally acknowledged: in 20 years, one conviction and unexecuted warrants (al-Bashir, Haroun, Hussein) — though defenders, rejectionists and Sudan draw opposite conclusions from it.
Fault Lines

Four fault lines run through the debate. Each names the poles, who anchors them, and the line that captures each side. (Every delegation's full stance is in the reference grid.)

1. Defend the Court vs. delegitimise it — the defining divide.
  • Defenders — France ("cooperation with the Court is an obligation, it's not an option"), Denmark, UK, Greece, Latvia, Panama and Colombia, several reaffirming "unwavering support" for the Court's independence and rejecting sanctions against its officials.
  • Rejectionists — the United States, which calls the ICC "a power-hungry institution," urges "all current states parties to the Rome Statute to withdraw," and says it is working "to dismantle the capabilities of the ICC"; and Russia, which calls it "the Hague pseudo-court," cites the Karim Khan harassment scandal, and demands withdrawal of the Darfur and Libya files.
  • The middle — China, Pakistan, Bahrain, Somalia: support accountability but subordinate it to Sudanese-led justice and "judicial sovereignty," warning against politicisation and "selective justice."
2. Scope of the mandate — expand or confine.
  • Expand to all Sudan: Denmark and France explicitly call on the Council to extend ICC jurisdiction beyond the 2005 Darfur referral to the entire territory; France adds an arms-embargo extension.
  • Confine to the original referral: Russia insists the mandate covers only "the situation as it existed" in 2003 and accuses the Court of "arbitrarily" taking up events 20 years later; China warns against "undue expansion" of the investigation's scope and timeframe.
3. Who is arming the war — generic vs. named.
  • Generic "foreign actors must cease": France, Denmark and the US all condemn external support in the abstract; the US says pressure is being applied "at the highest levels" (Secretary Rubio) on unnamed "relevant parties."
  • Named adversaries: Sudan names the UAE ("Abu Dhabi regime") as the RSF's financier and welcomes a European Parliament condemnation; and rebuts the US allegation that the Sudanese Armed Forces used chemical weapons, invoking the 1998 Al-Shifa factory strike and the Iraq-WMD precedent.
4. What the thin enforcement record means — the same fact, opposite conclusions. All sides note one conviction in 20 years and three unexecuted warrants. Defenders and Sudan conclude the Court must go faster — Sudan: "justice delayed is justice denied," demanding RSF warrants now. Russia concludes the Court has "failed its original assignment" and the file should be withdrawn. This is the debate's sharpest irony: Sudan (the situation's home state) and its usual protector Russia agree the record is poor but split on the remedy.
Outliers to monitor. United States — the only speaker to make attacking the ICC its headline and to explicitly exclude the Court from the peace effort ("importantly exclusive of the ICC"). Russia — uniquely raises the suspended prosecutor Karim Khan harassment scandal (citing the Times and New York Times) as evidence of ICC dysfunction. France — the only delegation tying the session to the Franco-Mexican veto-restraint initiative (now 120 states; Jamaica and Suriname just joined) and to Special Envoy Haavisto / the Quad and Quintet tracks. Sudan — the invited party runs an inverted host-state line: not shielding sovereignty from the Court but demanding the Court act faster against the RSF and its foreign backers.
Fault-Line Plot — Cluster Map

How to read this plot

Left → rightHow much a delegation put on the record, counted from verbatim quotes. Arguing at length against the Court sits on the right too.
Up / downWhich side it argued for. This is where direction lives.
ColourWhich camp a delegation belongs to.
Click a dotSee both rubrics behind the score; click a second to compare.

The right-hand column is where the file is actually contested: France, Denmark and Greece arguing for the Court, and the United States and Russia arguing against it from the bottom row. Same column, opposite rows, arguing past each other. The left of the grid is where a position was recorded rather than pressed.

Each delegation is scored on two rubrics of seven indicators — one for the Court, one against — and the horizontal position is the two added together. Dots are rank-spaced within a cell, never jittered. The briefer is unscored (dashed): the Court is not a delegation taking a position on itself. Positions reflect the 15 July 2026 meeting only. Rubric and caveats.

brief this delegation spoke well below the meeting median, so fewer indicators had the chance to appear.

Breakdown comparison — click dots to fill the two slots
Every quote is verbatim from the ASR transcript, and 20 of the quotes that carry the ordering claim were checked against the meeting audio on 29 July 2026; the rest are ASR-verbatim but not individually audio-checked. Grey parenthetical rows are analyst summaries of absence, not quotes. Scores are ordinal evidence tallies, not measurements. The ⇄ marker shows which delegation the next dot-click will replace — click the other slot's ⇄ to swap that one instead.
Scores at a Glance

Every delegation ranked from the one that argued hardest for the Court to the one that argued hardest against it. Each is scored on two rubrics of seven indicators: For is how much it put on the record backing the Court, Against is how much it put on the record opposing it. Net is For minus Against, which gives the direction. On record is the two added together — the total argued, either way — and that is what positions a dot horizontally, which is why France (94 for) and the United States (75 against) both sit to the right while facing opposite directions. The claim is ordinal — read it as "argued more than", not as a measurement. Full rubric, per-quote evidence and caveats are on the methodology page.

#DelegationOn recordForAgainstNetProfile in one line

Ties are shown as "7=" and are a finding, not an error: the United Kingdom and Liberia reach the same total in different registers — institutional warmth with soft verbs on one side, enforcement demands with no institutional layer on the other. Click both dots in the plot to compare the breakdowns.

Talking Points

These quotes were checked against the meeting audio (English channel) on 16 July 2026 and match the recording. Still an ASR transcript, not an official UN record.

"The Office of the Prosecutor is united with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in a collective view that the most serious international crimes may be about to take place in El Obeid. We cannot say we did not know. We cannot say it could not be expected."
— Deputy Prosecutor Najat Shamim Khan, the meeting's core early warning
"This is a paradigm shift. It is a breakthrough. And it sends a clear message to those who lead these attacks… you are mistaken."
— Deputy Prosecutor Khan, on witness evidence now linking recent crimes to high-level perpetrators
"We encourage all current states parties to the Rome Statute to withdraw from this power-hungry institution, which has grossly exceeded its legal authority."
— United States, the clearest anti-ICC position; adds the peace effort is being pursued "importantly exclusive of the ICC"
"We call on our colleagues on the Council to consider the withdrawal of the Darfur file, as well as the Libyan file, from the ICC… for such a dialogue, the Hague pseudo-court is merely an obvious obstacle."
— Russian Federation, pairing the ICC-dismissal with the Karim Khan scandal
"Cooperation with the Court is an obligation. It's not an option… We call on the United Nations Security Council to extend the jurisdiction of the ICC to the entire territory of Sudan."
— France, anchoring the defend-and-expand pole (echoed on expansion by Denmark)
"Justice delayed is justice denied… expediting accountability procedures and issuing arrest warrants against those responsible for these crimes has become a necessity."
— Sudan (invited party), pressing the Court to move faster and to investigate the UAE as the RSF's financier
Reference: Stances by Delegation
Showing 17 of 17

ICC — Deputy Prosecutor Khan

Briefer · ICC / OTP

Reports a "paradigm shift": witness evidence links recent Darfur crimes to high-level perpetrators. Joint OHCHR warning of imminent crimes in El Obeid. 130+ interviews; RSF non-cooperation a 1593 violation; "coercive actions" against the Court impede operations.

Denmark

Defend the Court · Expand

"El Obeid must not become another El Fasher." Calls to expand the ICC mandate to all of Sudan; arrest and surrender of al-Bashir, Hussein, Haroun; cease weapons supply; "unwavering support" for the Court's independence.

France

Defend the Court · Expand

"Cooperation is an obligation, not an option." Extend ICC jurisdiction to all Sudan; extend the arms embargo; backs Special Envoy Haavisto, the Quad/Quintet, and the Franco-Mexican veto-restraint initiative (now 120 states).

United Kingdom

Defend the Court · Confine

El Obeid "on the precipice of an atrocity"; recalls the 20 June Council demand to the RSF. Welcomes Sudanese cooperation and Port Sudan deployment; RSF non-cooperation regretted; "strong support for the ICC and its independence."

Greece

Defend the Court · Confine

"All eyes must now turn to El Obeid." Priority to gender-based crimes and crimes against children; urges cooperation from non-States-Parties under 1593; reparations in the Al-Rahman case; "defend the Rome Statute" against threats to the Court.

Latvia

Defend the Court · Confine

"Atrocities in Darfur are not a matter of the past." Cooperation is a "legal obligation" under 1593 extending to all parties; calls to arrest and surrender all suspects and for the RSF to engage; victims and reparations at the centre.

Panama

Defend the Court · Confine

State party to the Rome Statute; regrets the Prosecutor could not appear in person; four pending arrest warrants must be fulfilled; rejects "any coercive measure or retaliation" against the Court or those cooperating with it.

Colombia

Defend the Court · Confine

"Absolute support" for the ICC; regrets sanctions against the Court, its judges and officials; invites Sudan to guarantee prosecutor access on the ground; welcomes cooperation with civil society and the diaspora.

Liberia

Defend the Court · Confine

"Accountability cannot be measured solely by investigations and indictments — it must be reflected in arrests." Protection of women and children; attacks on schools "rob a state of its future"; calls for verifiable benchmarks and full ICC cooperation.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Defend the Court (chair) · Confine

Speaking in national capacity: strongly condemns sexual violence "as methods of warfare"; alarmed by drone escalation and IHL breaches; welcomes the Al-Rahman judgment, appeals and reparations; "fight against impunity is an essential element" of prevention.

China

Sovereignty middle · Confine

The Court must be "objective and impartial," avoid "politicisation and selective justice," respect judicial sovereignty and complementarity, and "prevent undue expansion" of the investigation's scope and timeframe; "countries outside the region" should cease interference.

Pakistan

Sovereignty middle · Confine

Condemns RSF abuses; alarmed by a possible offensive on El Obeid. Accountability must respect complementarity, national sovereignty and "Sudanese ownership," pursued "without selectivity or double standards"; reaffirms Sudan's territorial integrity.

Somalia

Sovereignty middle · Confine

Justice "sustainable when rooted in Sudanese efforts"; strengthen national justice institutions; concerned by RSF impunity in El Geneina and El Fasher; welcomes Sudanese cooperation while respecting sovereignty and complementarity.

Bahrain

Sovereignty middle · Confine

Emphasises complementarity — "the primary role of national judicial authorities," ICC "supportive and complementary." Backs a Sudanese-owned, Sudanese-led political process preserving sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity.

United States of America

Delegitimise · Confine

ICC "an intolerable threat" and "power-hungry institution"; running a campaign "to dismantle" it; urges Rome Statute parties to withdraw. Separately: RSF genocide, SAF "chemical weapons," drone warfare; peace pursued "exclusive of the ICC."

Russian Federation

Delegitimise · Confine

"Hague pseudo-court" that "failed its original assignment"; mandate covers only the 2003 situation; cites the Karim Khan harassment scandal; demands withdrawal of the Darfur and Libya files in favour of Sudanese-led, AU-supported justice.

Sudan (invited, Rule 37)

Invited party · Faster / expand

Presses the ICC to move faster and issue RSF arrest warrants — "justice delayed is justice denied." Demands investigations reach the UAE ("Abu Dhabi regime") as financier; rebuts the US chemical-weapons claim (1998 Al-Shifa, Iraq WMD precedent); reaffirms cooperation under the 2021 MoU.