UN80 at the Executive Board — UNDP, UNFPA and UNOPS

Subject
Agenda item 9, engagement with the UN80 initiative: the proposed UNDP–UNOPS merger and its terms of reference, and the proposed UNFPA–UN Women merger against its alternatives — 3rd meeting, second regular session 2026
Date
25 August 2026
Speakers
31 — the three executive heads, 27 delegations, and the President in the chair
Chair
President of the Executive Board of UNDP, UNFPA and UNOPS

How this was made — methodology

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Executive Summary

The Board met the heads of UNDP, UNFPA and UNOPS on one agenda item: engagement with the UN80 reform initiative. Two proposed mergers carried the session. UNDP and UNOPS have delivered a single terms of reference for an independent assessment of merging them. UNFPA and UN Women have delivered a costed comparison of a merger against lighter alternatives. Twenty-seven delegations answered.

Nobody argued against reform. The split is narrower and sharper than that: does the financial case for merging hold up well enough to act on now? The same documents produced opposite readings in the same room.

  • The case is good enough — act on it — France, Denmark, Spain, Norway, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany for 24 states, Japan and Portugal. France backs the terms of reference and puts a date on delivery: the first regular session of 2027.
  • Not yet convinced — Australia, Sweden, Armenia, Zambia for the African members, Belgium, Nepal for the LDCs, Canada and China. This group backs the UNDP–UNOPS assessment and withholds on UNFPA–UN Women.
  • The case is not made — the United States, Uruguay for the G77 and China, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Cuba, El Salvador, India, Iran and Belarus. The G77 asks the Board not to decide this year. The United States goes further and refuses the terms of reference themselves.
The finding worth taking away The United States and France read the same financial file and reach opposite verdicts. France counts the gap between the options: a merger yields "$38 million in recurring savings starting in 2030 versus $10 million under the alternative scenarios… over five years, that adds up to $100 million extra dollars, which could be invested in agency action". The United States counts the cost of getting there: "estimated merger transition costs reaching $250 million or more", with savings "likely to be swallowed by transition friction". Then UNOPS confirmed from the floor that both readings can stand, because the underlying numbers do not yet agree: "reconciliation will be needed on the numbers" (full quote below).

Colour key — a delegation's colour follows its name through the whole page and matches its dot in the plot: The case is good enough Not yet convinced The case is not made Presenter (not scored)

What the Three Heads Set Out

Each head opened with a test for judging reform, and each test is different. Read together they explain why the three organisations approach the same merger question from different places.

  • Alexander De Croo (UNDP, Administrator) set the test as delivery: "Evaluating reform is not about the structures that we create… Does it help us to deliver better?" He reported that UNDP and UNOPS have submitted the single terms of reference the Board asked for in June, and that both organisations are already moving on what he calls "no-regret steps" — joint offers, operational alignment, and a senior coordination mechanism — which "do not have an impact on mandates and do not have an impact on the independent assessments".
  • Diane Kitah (UNFPA, Executive Director) set the test as evidence handled honestly, and gave the room the numbers on work package four. Under the assumptions tested, alternatives to a merger "could generate annual savings of up to US$15 million from 2030 against transition costs up to $39 million over three years", implementable in one to four years. A structural merger "is projected to require nearly twice the transition investment and more than four years". The merger shows higher net savings, but "the analysis did not identify distinct additional programmatic or operational benefits beyond those potentially achievable through the alternatives" (full quote below).
  • Jorge Moreira da Silva (UNOPS, Executive Director) set the test as alignment, and was the one head to describe his own funding model in detail, because it is what makes a merger structurally awkward: "UNOPS operates on a demand-driven fee-for-service model. It receives no core funding, no assessed or core contributions, and each project covers its costs separately."

What the heads said when they answered back

The three replied in two rounds. Three answers moved the item further than the opening statements did.

  • The agencies' own numbers do not reconcile. Moreira da Silva said the five options in the joint report "may have differences on the numbers, on the cost effectiveness, the cost benefit, and on the transitions. So reconciliation will be needed on the numbers." He held that the content underneath is "very solid and robust". This concedes the factual premise the United States built its refusal on, while rejecting the conclusion drawn from it.
  • Waiting has a price that shows up in contracts. Moreira da Silva reported that partners are hesitating: "sometimes partners are postponing decisions to sign contracts, or are hesitant about signing contracts until there is clarity about the merger". UNOPS has offered a contractual clause promising that any future configuration honours existing agreements. He asked delegations not to treat an assessment as a reason to pause engagement (full quote below).
  • Both organisations work mostly in fragile places. De Croo put the two side by side: "George, you talked about 75% of your work, you haven't put a percentage on it, but in our case it's more than 50%." Moreira da Silva's own opening figure was "two thirds of our work takes place in complex and fragile settings".
How Each Organisation Is Funded

This session put the three funding models on the record together for the first time in this series. The differences matter for the merger question, because each model breaks in a different way under a structural change. The figures below are the ones stated in this meeting.

What each head said about their own organisation's money
OrganisationHow it is fundedScale on the recordWhat a merger puts at risk
UNDP Core and non-core contributions from member states, with core the smaller share. De Croo did not restate the core percentage at this meeting. "We have 4.9 billion of US dollar that we delivered last year", across 170 countries, with "more than 500 million people… dependent on us". Scale and country presence. More than 50% of its work is in fragile settings, where De Croo says UNDP is "there before the crisis… during the crisis, and… after the crisis".
UNFPA Core and non-core contributions. This meeting costed the merger question rather than the funding base. Alternatives: "annual savings of up to US$15 million from 2030 against transition costs up to $39 million over three years". A merger: "nearly twice the transition investment and more than four years to implement". Continuity of supply. Kitah lists what must not stop: "uninterrupted reproductive health commodities, maternal and newborn health care… population data, census and national planning support".
UNOPS No core funding at all. "It receives no core funding, no assessed or core contributions, and each project covers its costs separately." Two thirds of its work is in "complex and fragile settings"; De Croo put the figure at 75%. Demand itself. On a fee-for-service model, "if our partners don't like our work, they simply won't come back" — and partners are already "postponing decisions to sign contracts" while the merger is open.

Why the models pull against each other. Moreira da Silva named the difference as a real obstacle and then argued past it. The two organisations "have different business models, in our case it's demand driven fee for service model", and a merged entity would therefore have to run more than one funding logic at once. His proposed answer is to make the logic explicit rather than blend it: "fee for services for projects, core funding for policy, pooled funding for missions and transitions".

Where the money question meets the delegations. Only two delegations brought their own funding position into the room. Denmark anchored its argument in what it pays: "our 0.7 commitment and substantial core contributions to select UN funds and programs". Spain brought the system-wide figure, citing "the last progress report" that "the efficiencies obtained by the system obtained some $900 million in 2025", and asked the Board to strengthen the Joint SDG Fund under work package 18 so that financing itself becomes less fragmented.

Areas of Consensus

These hold across all three camps, including between delegations that disagree on whether to act.

  • Reform itself is not contested. Every delegation that spoke supports UN80 in principle, including the United States, which "prioritizes reform of the United Nations system, including through UNAT". The argument is about this evidence and this timing.
  • Mandates must survive whatever is decided. Named by almost every delegation and by all three heads. Moreira da Silva put it plainly: "If there is a merger, mandates are not at stake."
  • Member states decide, not the agencies. All three heads said so unprompted. Moreira da Silva: "we are in your hands." Kitah: "Once Member States decide through the appropriate intergovernmental process, I will implement that decision with discipline and loyalty."
  • UN80 is bigger than the two mergers. Raised by Germany's 24-state group, Netherlands, Sweden, Australia and Spain, and endorsed by all three heads. Country team reconfiguration, the regional reset, expertise on demand and unified services carry the reform whether or not either merger proceeds.
  • Programme countries must be consulted during the assessment, not after it. Asked for by Zambia for the African members, Uruguay for the G77, Brazil, India, South Africa and El Salvador. Moreira da Silva accepted it: "the assessment can't be done in isolation from those we serve".
  • The non-structural alternatives are worth pursuing either way. Both agencies and most delegations agree the "no-regret" collaboration should proceed now. De Croo and Moreira da Silva both committed to it independently of the assessment's outcome.
  • Efficiency is a means, not the goal. Norway: "Efficiency is important, but it is a means to an end, not an end in itself." Denmark makes it a condition: it "does not support the exploration of a possible merger as a cost saving exercise". Zambia agrees from the other camp: UN80 "should not be viewed as an exercise in reducing structures or costs".
Fault Lines

Four divides carried the session. Each names its poles, who anchors them, and one quote per side.

1. Is the financial evidence good enough to act on?

This is the divide the plot measures. Both sides work from the same documents.

  • The numbers show a gap worth closing. France: "It would appear that a merger will result in $38 million in recurring savings starting in 2030 versus $10 million under the alternative scenarios. Over five years, that adds up to $100 million extra dollars, which could be invested in agency action."
  • The numbers do not survive the cost of getting there. The United States: "This comes alongside estimated merger transition costs reaching $250 million or more. In an era of shrinking budgets, every dollar spent on external consulting and administrative restructuring is a dollar diverted from direct field delivery" (full quote below).
  • Where the agencies left it. Moreira da Silva conceded the numbers differ between the five options and said reconciliation is needed, while defending the analysis underneath them as "very solid and robust". Kitah framed her own figures the same way: "These are projection excellencies, not conclusions. They should inform, not predetermine your judgments."

2. Should the Board pay for an independent assessment at all?

  • Yes, and set a deadline. France supports the terms of reference and asks for results "ideally by the first regular session of the Executive Board in 2027". Germany's 24-state group calls the joint terms of reference "a sound basis for Member States to consider a way forward".
  • No. The United States is the only delegation to refuse them outright: "we cannot support the terms of reference or a board decision for a costly and drawn out merger that the member states did not propose". It puts the consultancy at "one and a half to $2 million" and points to another UN agency that obtained comparable work "gratis… as part of a corporate social responsibility at no cost".
  • Yes, with conditions attached. Zambia for the African members supports proceeding but asks that the assessment "should not presume that merger is a preferred outcome" and should model "scenarios where projected savings, revenues or efficiencies do not materialize".

3. Should the UNFPA–UN Women merger proceed, or the alternatives?

This is the more settled of the two mergers, and it settled against the merger. Nine delegations state they cannot support it as presented: Sweden, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Mexico, South Africa, Brazil, Canada, Iran and the G77 collectively.

  • The mandate risk is not yet answered. The United Kingdom: "there is not sufficient evidence for the UK to support a merger at this time, nor assurance that mandates will be protected."
  • Keep exploring it anyway. Denmark is the clearest voice on this side: it "continue[s] to see clear value in exploring closer integration, including through a possible merger between UNFPA and UN Women", while insisting mandates are protected.
  • A middle path exists. Zambia for the African members proposes joint governance instead of structural merger: strengthening coordination between the two executive boards, which "could provide a practical middle ground, greater institutional coherence without immediately incurring the full transition costs and operational risks associated with a merger".

4. How fast should any of this move?

  • Not this year. Uruguay for the G77 and China: decisions on structural mergers "should not be rushed during the current year", and "the necessary conditions are not in place to approve structural mergers".
  • Delay has its own cost. Moreira da Silva asks that an assessment not become a reason to pause: "please do not use that as a reason to pause or to slow down the engagement with the agencies, because we cannot slow down in a moment where there are so many people in need in developing countries."
  • Move on the parts that need no decision. De Croo's no-regret steps, endorsed by Belgium, Brazil, Uruguay and France alike. This is the one thing both ends of the room agree to do immediately.

Positions that sit outside the four divides

  • Belgium asked the one question in the session about the legitimacy of the outcome rather than its substance: whether "the perceived legitimacy and operational capacity of a potential new entity would be impacted in case of a reform based on a close or contentious vote, rather than by consensus". It went unanswered in both reply rounds.
  • Japan asked for something nobody else asked for: "clear information on the funding sources and cost breakdowns for the assessment and implementation of any option considered" — that is, who pays for the consultancy itself.
  • Spain was the only delegation to argue that the financing architecture, not the entity structure, is the thing to reform, backing work package 18 to make the Joint SDG Fund "the main joint fund" for development the way the Peacebuilding Fund works for peace.
  • UNFPA pushed back on one reform workstream in its closing, and only one. On expertise on demand, Kitah said population data, gender-based violence and reproductive health work "cannot any expert cannot come in country at the last time to do the job. This is based on trust… you need to build that relation throughout the years."
  • Nepal for the LDCs noted that the entities have "different mandates, funding models, and comparative advantages" — the closest the room came to engaging the funding-model contrast the three heads had set out.
Fault-Line Plot — Cluster Map

How to read this plot

Left → rightHow much a delegation put on the record about the merger evidence, counted from verbatim quotes. Arguing at length that the case fails sits on the right too.
Up / downWhich side it argued for. This is where direction lives.
ColourWhich camp a delegation belongs to.
Click a dotSee both rubrics behind the score; click a second to compare.

The right-hand column holds the delegations that argued the evidence question at length, in both directions. The United States and France sit there on opposite rows, reading the same file to opposite conclusions. Sweden and China tie in the middle row from opposite starting points — Sweden protecting the UNFPA mandate while urging faster reform elsewhere, China asking for evidence and member-state consensus.

Each delegation is scored on two rubrics of seven indicators — one for the case that the evidence is good enough to act on, one for the case that it is not — and the horizontal position is the two added together. Dots are rank-spaced within a cell, never jittered. The three executive heads are unscored and sit in their own band below the dashed line. They authored the case the axis measures reactions to, so they hold no position on it. Portugal spoke below the brevity threshold and carries a brief chip. Positions reflect the 25 August 2026 meeting only. Rubrics and caveats.

Breakdown comparison — click dots to fill the two slots
Every quote is verbatim from the automatic-speech-recognition transcript. The 15 quotes in Talking Points were checked against the meeting audio on 26 August 2026 and match the recording. Grey parenthetical rows are analyst summaries of absence, not quotes. Scores are ordinal evidence tallies, not measurements. The ⇆ marker shows which delegation the next dot-click will replace — click the other slot's ⇆ to swap that one instead.
Scores at a Glance

Every scored delegation, ordered by how far its argument sits from neutral. On record is the total put on the record either way, and is what the plot's horizontal axis shows. For is the case that the evidence is good enough to act on; against is the case that it is not.

Scored delegations — 27 of 31 speakers. The three executive heads present the case being judged and are not scored; the President is procedural.
#DelegationOn recordForAgainstNetWords
Tracked Figures

This track follows a small number of load-bearing figures across meetings, and reports whether the room comes back to them. A figure is tracked when a reader would want to know, going into the next session, whether anyone answers it.

Figure 1 No reaction this round

At the 2nd meeting on 24 August, UNDP's Chief Financial Officer George Kuriakou opened the core budget to answer a question about priorities. The 2026 core programme budget is $321 million, of which $130 million was collected. Of that, $170 million is fixed by Board resolution under a "predetermined formula", leaving $85.4 million of management discretion plus $24.1 million for crises. His conclusion: "when we have a level in 2025, 9% of our funding is core, that doesn't mean 9% is subject to management discretion."

Why it is tracked. It changes what the core-funding argument is about. A reader who knows only that core is 9% will assume the organisation can steer that 9%. On these figures, roughly a quarter of it is actually steerable.

Reactions by meeting
MeetingReactionWho
2nd meeting, 24 Aug 2026PlantedGeorge Kuriakou, UNDP Chief Financial Officer
3rd meeting, 25 Aug 2026No reaction. No delegation cited the figures and none argued the discretion question. Kuriakou did not speak.—

The nearest thing to a response came from Nepal, which noted the entities have "different mandates, funding models, and comparative advantages" — a comparison between organisations rather than an answer about UNDP's own core budget. An unanswered figure is recorded here rather than dropped.

Figure 2 New this round

UNOPS Executive Director Jorge Moreira da Silva conceded that the two agencies' five merger options do not agree with one another on the money: "Those five options that we have densified in the report may have differences on the numbers, on the cost effectiveness, the cost benefit, and on the transitions. So reconciliation will be needed on the numbers."

Why it is tracked. It is the agencies confirming the factual claim the United States built its refusal on — that the Board is being asked to fund a consultancy to reconcile divergent data. Whether the independent assessment actually reconciles those numbers is the question the next rounds should answer.

Talking Points

The verbatim record of the quotes the analysis rests on. All 15 were checked against the meeting audio on 26 August 2026 and match the recording; no corrections were needed.

“Development can only be judged by one thing, and that is the impact that we have on the lives of the people we support… Evaluating reform is not about the structures that we create. It's not about the reports that we make. It should be guided by one question: Does it help us to deliver better?”

— Alexander De Croo
, UNDP Administrator, opening statement

“UNOPS operates on a demand-driven fee-for-service model. It receives no core funding, no assessed or core contributions, and each project covers its costs separately. Everything we do, we do it in partnership. If our partners don't like our work, they simply won't come back.”

— Jorge Moreira da Silva
, UNOPS Executive Director, opening statement

“Under the assumptions tested, the alternative options could generate annual savings of up to US$15 million from 2030 against transition costs up to $39 million over three years… A structural merger is projected to require nearly twice the transition investment and more than four years to implement… the analysis did not identify distinct additional programmatic or operational benefits beyond those potentially achievable through the alternatives. These are projection excellencies, not conclusions. They should inform, not predetermine your judgments.”

— Diane Kitah
, UNFPA Executive Director, on work package four

“We are being asked to consider committing increasingly scarce resources to a costly year-long consultancy simply to reconcile divergent data for a merger member states did not propose and for which no rationale has been given… This comes alongside estimated merger transition costs reaching $250 million or more. In an era of shrinking budgets, every dollar spent on external consulting and administrative restructuring is a dollar diverted from direct field delivery.”

— United States

“we cannot support the terms of reference or a board decision for a costly and drawn out merger that the member states did not propose”

— United States

“It would appear that a merger will result in $38 million in recurring savings starting in 2030 versus $10 million under the alternative scenarios. Over five years, that adds up to $100 million extra dollars, which could be invested in agency action.”

— France

“the Group of 77 and China believes that the necessary conditions are not in place to approve structural mergers that would entail a prolonged process of institutional restructuring… Member States decision making processes on structural merger options… should not be rushed during the current year.”

— Uruguay
, for the Group of 77 and China

“Canada believes that the information we have available at present does not yet meet the standards for reliable evidence, financial rigor and risk analysis, standards or requirements which need to be fulfilled in order for us to agree to support such a venture at present.”

— Canada

“Those five options that we have densified in the report may have differences on the numbers, on the cost effectiveness, the cost benefit, and on the transitions. So reconciliation will be needed on the numbers, but on the content… I think that the joint work of the two organisations is very solid and robust.”

— Jorge Moreira da Silva
, UNOPS Executive Director, closing reply

“I'm getting reports from my colleagues on the ground… that sometimes partners are postponing decisions to sign contracts, or are hesitant about signing contracts until there is clarity about the merger… I kindly ask you please do not use that as a reason to pause or to slow down the engagement with the agencies, because we cannot slow down in a moment where there are so many people in need in developing countries.”

— Jorge Moreira da Silva
, UNOPS Executive Director, first reply round

“there is not sufficient evidence for the UK to support a merger at this time, nor assurance that mandates will be protected… Any merger decisions should be informed by strong evidence and full transparency regarding the costs of transition, the scale of efficiencies, the implications for future funding.”

— United Kingdom

“It could provide a practical middle ground, greater institutional coherence without immediately incurring the full transition costs and operational risks associated with a merger. However, this should not simply create another layer of bureaucracy.”

— Zambia
, for the African members of the Board

“Denmark does not support the exploration of a possible merger as a cost saving exercise, and any decision with regard to the merger assessment should be guided by the aim of strengthening coherence, institutional capacity and ensuring more effective and impactful delivery of mandates at country level in the long term.”

— Denmark

“According to the last progress report, the efficiencies obtained by the system obtained some $900 million in 2025.”

— Spain

“could you, Madam Executive Director, clarify if the perceived legitimacy and operational capacity of a potential new entity would be impacted in case of a reform based on a close or contentious vote, rather than by consensus?”

— Belgium
— not answered in either reply round
Reference: Stances by Delegation

Showing 30 of 30

France

The case is good enough

Supports the terms of reference for the independent UNDP–UNOPS assessment and asks for results "ideally by the first regular session of the Executive Board in 2027". The only delegation to quantify what the choice between options is worth: a merger yields "$38 million in recurring savings starting in 2030 versus $10 million under the alternative scenarios", which "over five years… adds up to $100 million extra dollars". Encourages the two agencies to keep cooperating in the interim, naming energy transition as the example. On UNFPA–UN Women it welcomes the additional information and asks for measures that can start now, "without prejudging".

United States of America

The case is not made

The only delegation to refuse the terms of reference: "we cannot support the terms of reference or a board decision for a costly and drawn out merger that the member states did not propose". Prices the consultancy at "one and a half to $2 million" and transition at "$250 million or more", and argues "every dollar spent on external consulting and administrative restructuring is a dollar diverted from direct field delivery". Points to another UN agency that obtained comparable consultancy work "gratis… as part of a corporate social responsibility". States its disappointment at the agencies' "inability… to collaboratively answer questions this Board has asked". Supports UN reform in principle and welcomes the two agencies' own collaboration.

Denmark

The case is good enough

Backs exploring both mergers, and is the clearest voice for keeping the UNFPA–UN Women option open: it sees "clear value in exploring closer integration". Brings its own funding position into the argument — "our 0.7 commitment and substantial core contributions to select UN funds and programs". Rules out the cost rationale explicitly: it "does not support the exploration of a possible merger as a cost saving exercise", and wants any decision guided by coherence, institutional capacity and country-level delivery. Asks UNDP and UNOPS to progress the assessment "in a timely manner".

United Kingdom

The case is good enough

Three points: delivery, mandates and evidence. Uses obligation language on the reform agenda — "We expect UN leadership to fully deliver this agenda" — and wants back-office consolidation to build "a leaner, more effective and resilient operational backbone". Sets an evidence threshold the UNFPA merger does not meet: "there is not sufficient evidence for the UK to support a merger at this time, nor assurance that mandates will be protected". Appreciates the joint terms of reference on UNDP–UNOPS and urges momentum, while asking that alternatives be "rigorously explored where they may deliver comparable benefits at lower cost".

Zambia

Not yet convinced — African members

Speaks for the African members of the Board. Supports proceeding with the independent assessment while asking that it "should not presume that merger is a preferred outcome" and that it model "scenarios where projected savings, revenues or efficiencies do not materialize". Proposes the session's one concrete middle path on UNFPA–UN Women: stronger coordination between the two executive boards, which "could provide a practical middle ground… without immediately incurring the full transition costs", with the caveat that it "should not simply create another layer of bureaucracy". Argues UN80 "should not be viewed as an exercise in reducing structures or costs".

Germany

The case is good enough — 24 states

Delivers the joint statement for 24 delegations including the EU as a donor. Full support for UN80, and the joint terms of reference are "a sound basis for Member States to consider a way forward". Makes mandate preservation a condition that cannot be traded: it "must not be compromised at any stage of the process". Remains open to options "where evidence demonstrates clear added value, feasibility, cost effectiveness, and a positive impact on delivery". Places the mergers in the wider reform: country team reconfiguration, the regional reset, expertise on demand and financing arrangements all matter.

Uruguay

The case is not made — G77 and China

Speaks for the Group of 77 and China. Supports UN80's objective, and states that "the necessary conditions are not in place to approve structural mergers that would entail a prolonged process of institutional restructuring". Asks that decisions "not be rushed during the current year", and welcomes that the assessment's final report will not arrive before the 2027 annual session. Wants the Board to agree a "pragmatic, concise, and consensual" decision focused on non-structural alternatives — combining operational functions, exploring joint ventures — as a first phase before any structural step. Asks that programme countries be consulted throughout.

Netherlands

The case is good enough

Asks UNDP and UNOPS to "provide their final report swiftly so the Board can provide a recommendation on a merger". Separately withholds on UNFPA–UN Women: "we do not have sufficient evidence that a full merger would preserve the distinct mandates", while seeing "significant opportunities in the alternatives". Presses on the wider reform, and is the only delegation to ask about expertise on demand in detail — whether pilots are delivering, what is working, and where the approaches can scale. Asks what support the agencies need from member states.

Norway

The case is good enough

Calls both mergers "constructive propositions that could lead to a more coherent UN development system", and says the information before the Board "documents efficiency gains". Then names the limit: "Efficiency is important, but it is a means to an end, not an end in itself", and reform "must not be a mere cost-cutting exercise" — the aim is to free resources for country level. Shares the risk concerns raised by others and insists mandates and normative frameworks are safeguarded, naming gender equality, women's rights and sexual and reproductive health and rights.

Spain

The case is good enough

The one delegation arguing that the financing architecture, not the entity structure, is the thing to reform. Brings the system-wide figure: "the efficiencies obtained by the system obtained some $900 million in 2025". Backs work package 18 to strengthen the Joint SDG Fund and consolidate it as the main joint fund for sustainable development, "similarly to the way the world peacebuilding fund plays in peacekeeping". Anchors everything in the 2018 reform, which it wants consolidated and deepened. On the mergers it prefers "to deepen the functional integration before considering a merger".

Canada

Not yet convinced

States an explicit evidentiary standard and says the present information fails it: the available information "does not yet meet the standards for reliable evidence, financial rigor and risk analysis… in order for us to agree to support such a venture at present". Staunchly supports UN80 and the development system reform, which it says "are producing results". Wants a resident coordinator and humanitarian coordinator system "more robust and financed in a sustainable fashion". Reaffirms strong support for UNFPA's "singular normative mandate", and asks for a path that does not interrupt service delivery.

Australia

Not yet convinced

Engages constructively with terms of reference it says "do not capture issues perfectly". Sets its threshold as in-country impact: whether the options "contribute to a more effective, efficient, and coherent UN development system demonstrated through in-country impact". Argues mergers must be "backed by a compelling case commensurate with the scale, complexity and importance of the work". Draws a line on the UNFPA mandate: reform "cannot become a means for dismantling important progress, protections, and services secured over decades". Raises small island developing states as a specific delivery concern.

Japan

The case is good enough

Aligns with the Germany group statement and adds the question nobody else asks: who pays. Expects "clear information on the funding sources and cost breakdowns for the assessment and implementation of any option considered". Appreciates the comprehensive UNFPA report as "a valuable framework for comparison, including from a cost aspect", and welcomes the joint UNDP–UNOPS terms of reference. Wants emerging findings shared early rather than at the end. Emphasises field-level service delivery in fragile settings, and says the regional mandates of both organisations must be preserved across every option.

Belgium

Not yet convinced

Documents a complaint about the Board's own working conditions: access to "timely, complete and evidence-based information… has often not been met, limiting Member States' ability to fulfill their oversight role". Says it is still unclear how the two mandates would be preserved, because the documentation "does not provide explicit assurances or a clearly defined mechanism". Asks the one question in the session about the legitimacy of the outcome rather than its substance — whether a new entity created "based on a close or contentious vote, rather than by consensus" would be weakened by it. It went unanswered.

Sweden

Not yet convinced

Refuses the UNFPA–UN Women merger and urges speed on everything else. "We are not in a position to support such a merger at this stage due to the associated risks for the organization's critical mandates", and it encourages UNFPA to implement the alternative options instead and report back. On the wider reform it is among the most forward-leaning: full implementation of already agreed reforms "is imperative", and it urges UNFPA, UNDP and UNOPS to advance country team reconfiguration, the regional reset, expertise on demand, common back offices and shared service centres.

Portugal

The case is good enoughbrief

The shortest statement of the session. Welcomes "an evidence-based and comprehensive assessment of the potential UNDP UNOPS merger" as a way to identify the arrangements with the greatest added value. Recognises UNFPA and UN Women as "indispensable pillars of the UN development system" whose normative leadership and technical expertise remain essential. Frames the whole exercise in one line: "structural reform is a means, not an end. Its success should be measured by its ability to deliver better for people and planet."

Armenia

Not yet convinced

Sees the logic of the UNDP–UNOPS pairing in principle — UNDP's "development policy expertise, country presence and pragmatic role" alongside UNOPS's "implementation focused capacities in infrastructure, procurement and operational support". Welcomes that the terms of reference reflect member-state concerns including country-level delivery. Conditions any decision on "a complete and independent assessment", and on UNFPA asks for a phased, transparent approach that maintains donor confidence and uninterrupted services. Wants sufficient time for the Board to consider whatever comes back.

Brazil

The case is not made

Spoke without reading its statement. Thanks the principals for the work and calls the UNDP–UNOPS dynamic productive. On UNFPA–UN Women it draws a distinction the analysis cannot resolve for the Board: the complementary assessment provides information and ideas but "does not provide and could not provide and should not provide… the political assessment of the pros and cons". On that basis, "we are unable to support the merger because we are unconvinced that the proper conditions, political conditions are there". Wants the entities to work the alternatives fully, and decisions taken "when the time comes".

China

Not yet convinced

Aligns with the G77 statement and adds three points: preserve core mandates, ground the reform in facts and evidence, and consolidate broad consensus. Takes note of the terms of reference and "expects the two entities to further improve it on the basis of views shared by all parties". Makes member-state consensus the test any proposal must pass: the process should be transparent and inclusive, "ensuring that the concerns and questions of all parties receive adequate responses". Wants entities to use the reform to cut administrative costs and shift resource allocation toward country level.

India

The case is not made

Aligns with the G77. Makes four asks of the assessment, one of them methodological: financial sustainability should be judged "not only [on] projected efficiency gains, but also transition and restructuring costs, cost recovery arrangements, and longer term financial implications". Also wants a specific analysis of programme-country needs, a comprehensive look at alternatives such as shared services, and meaningful member-state consultation on methodology and emerging findings. Concludes that decisions "with significant long-term institutional consequences should not be rushed".

Mexico

The case is not made

States that "the conditions are not met… to support a merger between UNFPA and UN Women", on three considerations: mandate integrity, evidence, and results on the ground. Offers the session's clearest statement of an evidentiary principle: "The reliability of evidence should be proportional to the scale of the reform." Argues "efficiency should not be reduced to simple institutional consolidation", and prefers alternatives that strengthen shared services. Wants the executive boards' role in oversight and evaluation strengthened. Ends by saying it "does not defend the status quo".

South Africa

The case is not made

Makes sequencing the objection rather than the merger itself. The assessment "is not a final country-by-country implementation plan", so the country-level consequences would only become clear after the structural decision was taken. "It is therefore important that these implications are understood before, rather than only after, a structural decision is taken", which it says matters particularly for Africa and other programme countries. On that basis it is "not in a position to support the merger between UNFPA and UN Women at this stage", while supporting the alternatives and welcoming the UNDP–UNOPS terms of reference.

Cuba

The case is not made

Sets out five principles, led by continuity: "No reform can justify the interruption of programs and projects that are being implemented." Names something no other delegation prices — institutional credibility as a resource that change can spend: "Changes could generate loss of trust among donors and affect the availability of resources at all levels." Sees possible complementarity between UNDP's programme capacity and UNOPS's operational strengths, alongside risks of "weakening of basic financing and dilution of the distinct capabilities of each entity". Asks for consultation "without imposing artificial deadlines".

El Salvador

The case is not made

Reads the financial projections as too soft to decide on: they "are based on assumptions and do not offer certainty whether the envisioned savings can be generated", so alternatives should be judged on programme and operational benefits instead. Asks the UNDP–UNOPS analysis to reach the operational and substantive level, including "the makeup of the various teams in country offices". Notes the workload the coming consultations will place on delegations and secretariats, and asks that the process toward a new draft decision have "sufficient transparency and neutrality".

Iran

The case is not made

Grounds its position in mandates and national ownership. On UNFPA–UN Women it states a concern directly: the two entities "have distinct and clearly defined mandates… Combining them could seriously affect the effectiveness and delivery of their program." On UNDP–UNOPS it asks that discussions "be approached with great care and that all their implications be fully considered", protecting the efficiency and national ownership of UNDP country projects. Offers three tests for UN80: efficiency without loss of capacity, coherence without weakening mandates, and reform that reinforces national ownership.

Belarus

The case is not made

Supports the Secretary-General's UN80 effort and, in the same breath, says it is "disquieted by the potential consequences this reform will have for the UN development system". Names the liquidity crisis as context. Wants a transparent intergovernmental process "underpinned by evidence, one that must not be rushed", with final decisions taken by member states. Frames the risk as procedural drift: "The process should not replace the result." Asks that the reform strip out bureaucracy and duplication without weakening mandates, entities, or support to beneficiary countries.

Nepal

Not yet convinced — LDC Group

Speaks for the least developed countries, home to "nearly 1.2 billion people". Supports the reform and sets three priorities: a member-state-led and evidence-based process, reforms that reinforce rather than weaken the development pillar, and country-level delivery as the central consideration. Notes the assessments find the entities are "distinct at complementary organizations with different mandates, funding models, and comparative advantages" — the closest the room comes to engaging the funding-model contrast the three heads set out. Asks that transition work not divert resources or management attention from programme countries.

Alexander De Croo — UNDP

Presenter — not scored

UNDP Administrator. Sets the test for reform as delivery, not structure: "Does it help us to deliver better?" Reports UNDP active in 170 countries, "4.9 billion of US dollar that we delivered last year", and more than 500 million people relying on it. Confirms the joint terms of reference are submitted, and announces "no-regret steps" with UNOPS — joint offers, operational alignment, senior coordination — that do not prejudge the assessment. Puts UNDP's fragile-settings share at "more than 50%". Points ahead to the funding conversation and "a good mix of different funding options".

Diane Kitah — UNFPA

Presenter — not scored

UNFPA Executive Director. Presents the costed comparison on work package four: alternatives save "up to US$15 million from 2030 against transition costs up to $39 million over three years", while a structural merger needs "nearly twice the transition investment and more than four years". The merger shows higher net savings, but the analysis "did not identify distinct additional programmatic or operational benefits" beyond the alternatives. Frames the figures carefully: "These are projection excellencies, not conclusions." Commits to implementing whatever member states decide, and pushes back on expertise on demand for UNFPA's own data and commodity work.

Jorge Moreira da Silva — UNOPS

Presenter — not scored

UNOPS Executive Director. Describes a funding model unlike the other two: "no core funding, no assessed or core contributions, and each project covers its costs separately", with two thirds of the work in fragile settings. Concedes the analytical gap the United States built its refusal on — the five options "may have differences on the numbers… reconciliation will be needed on the numbers" — while defending the underlying work as "very solid and robust". Reports partners "postponing decisions to sign contracts" while the merger stays open, and asks the Board not to let an assessment slow engagement.