Funding the New Development Model — UNDP at the Executive Board (26 August 2026)

Executive Summary

The Board held its interactive dialogue with the UNDP Administrator. Alexander de Croo set out a new development model: aid moves from paying for projects to unlocking investment. Raise more domestic revenue, borrow on fairer terms, share what works. Thirty-six delegations answered over three hours. The room accepted the model almost without dissent.

The argument was about what the model costs to run. De Croo put it in one line: "There is one constraint which we cannot reform our way around, and that is funding." The divide is who has to move to lift that constraint — the contributors, or UNDP itself.

Contributors must restore core funding — the position of most of the room, and the position UNDP asked for. Anchored by the Dominican Republic, which asks that "all states, without exception, should stop the drop in core funding", Rwanda, Uruguay for the G77 and China, Bhutan, the Netherlands, Germany and Côte d'Ivoire.
Protect what the money buys on the ground — the same concern reached through country presence rather than through the funding line. Nepal for the least developed countries, the Philippines for the middle income group, Nauru, Armenia, Cuba, El Salvador, Timor-Leste and others. Their test is whether reform leaves the country office intact.
Make the capital model work — Finland, Japan and France engage the investment side and say little about the core decline. Finland names the instrument it funds: Tax Inspectors Without Borders.
The constraint is UNDP's own structure — the United States, alone. It accepts the investment model and rejects the funding conclusion: UNDP "must urgently restructure its executive leadership and downside top level overhead" before anything else.

The finding worth taking away The delegations that argued most about restoring core funding are not the ones paying for it. The Dominican Republic (86 on record), Rwanda (79) and Uruguay (78) sit at the top of the scale; they are programme countries or programme-country groups. The two delegations that announced or maintained core contributions — the Netherlands with "40 million euros in multiannual core funding" and Germany, which "increased its core contribution despite severe budget constraints" — sit below them at 70 and 68. A state that has already paid rarely also demands that others pay. The scale measures how much was argued, not who wrote the cheque.

Colour key — a delegation's colour follows its name through the whole page and matches its dot in the plot: Contributors must restore core Protect country presence Make the capital model work Fix UNDP's structure first Presenter (not scored)

What the Administrator Proposed

De Croo spent most of his opening on a model rather than on a budget. The argument runs in two halves that depend on each other, and the second half is the one the room came back to.

Half one: aid becomes the thing that unlocks other money

The starting claim is that aid alone can no longer close the gap, and that this makes the use of aid more important rather than less. De Croo put the arithmetic plainly: "$1 of development money can support one project. But $1 of development money invested in institutions, invested in strengthening systems, invested in reducing risks, that can support a multiple of projects." Three named instruments carry it:

Raise more. Domestic revenue is the most durable source. Tax Inspectors Without Borders, run with the OECD, "has been able to raise $2.7 billion of domestic taxation that otherwise would not have been mobilized".
Borrow better. Countries pay a premium "because of the perception of risk instead of the reality of risk". The African Credit Ratings Initiative works on the gap between the two.
Share what works. South-South exchange as a delivery method, not a slogan: the Colombian tax administration now advises Guatemala's.

He named results where the model has already run. In Viet Nam, UNDP built the regulatory framework that let green capital flow, and was explicit that it did not supply the money: "UNDP did not provide the financing. But we helped to create the confidence that enabled the financing from other partners to flow." In Ukraine, UNDP helped unlock $1.6 billion of European Investment Bank recovery investment, at a stated leverage of "$70 in infrastructure recovery" per dollar. An SDG investor map in Serbia identified "8.3 billion of direct investable potential".

Half two: the model runs on core funding

The second half is the ask. Catalytic work needs money that is not already committed to a project, because the openings it exploits do not wait. De Croo: "A crisis does not wait for the next funding cycle." He put three figures behind it — every core dollar "is mobilizing roughly $10 in additional resources"; 91 cents of every dollar "is going directly into the field"; and continued erosion risks "losing as much as 40% of the impact that we have today". Both passages appear in full in Talking Points; the figures themselves are listed with every other number stated in this meeting in The Figures Put on the Record.

He also set the limit of what reform can do, in the sentence the room quoted back at him: "There is one constraint which we cannot reform our way around, and that is funding." The MOPAN assessment, he said, found UNDP had "done its homework".

The ask is smaller than it sounds de Croo did not ask for more money. He asked for a different share of the same money: "Not necessarily more funding, but more core funding." In the reply round he made the concession explicit — "if you cannot do more, please do core". One delegation said this was too modest. Viet Nam asked partners "to contribute more and contribute core".

What he said when he answered back

De Croo replied once, halfway through the speakers' list, and grouped the questions by topic rather than answering delegations one by one. He named who had asked what as he went. Three of those answers went beyond the opening statement. Each is given below with the question it answers and the delegation that put it.

Cost recovery cannot substitute for core.
The question — Rwanda, Norway, Nepal for the least developed countries and Côte d'IvoireCould UNDP raise the cost-recovery rate it charges on earmarked projects, and let that revenue make up for the fall in core? De Croo grouped this with the wider round of questions on the impact of the cuts, and credited it to those four.

His answerHe put a number on it: "if we want today to compensate for the erosion of core by increasing the cost recovery, that would mean that you would have to double the cost recovery". He did not rule it out, and noted the rules are harmonised with UNICEF, UNFPA and UN Women, so UNDP cannot move alone.
Most of core is already spoken for.
The question — Norway"if the current financial trends continue, Norway would like to have more information about the priorities and the arbitrations that the UNDP has envisaged. What functions and what areas of activity need to be protected and where will cuts become inevitable?"

His answerHe opened the allocation formula: "if we respect the priorities put in that formula, there is only 80 million which is left, which is based on our own discretionary decisions that we can take". He proposed the Board revisit that formula, "because this allocation formula dates from a time when core was in a bigger volume". The passage in full is in Talking Points, the section listing every quote the analysis rests on.
Climate and gender are economic positions, not political ones.
The question — United States"On climate, UNDP must stay away from climate ideology and focus on environmental resilience and preparedness. On gender issues, stay away from ideology and focus on creating equal opportunity for men and women and boy and girls."

His answerHe took the charge head-on, without naming the delegation that made it: "Neither for climate, neither for gender. This is based on ideology. This is based on economics." He grounded both in capability — unused talent and slowed economic activity — rather than in values.

The Figures Put on the Record

Delegations brought their own numbers rather than repeating the Administrator's. The figures below are the ones stated in this meeting, with the speaker who stated them. Where two speakers give different figures for the same thing, both are shown and neither is reconciled here, because neither speaker gave a basis for the difference.

Funding figures stated in this meeting
Who	The figure	What it is measuring
Uruguay	ODA fell 23.3% in 2025, with a further 6.9% projected for 2026. Core contributions to the UN system fell 27%, "the largest annual decline on record". 32 member states contributed core.	The system-wide picture, for the G77 and China.
Rwanda	ODA fell 23.1% in 2025. UNDP's own core fell 24%. Core is now "less than one-tenth of UNDP's overall resources".	UNDP's position inside that picture.
Côte d'Ivoire	UNDP mobilised $9.6 billion between 2022 and 2025, "around 91% of estimated contributions". Core fell 24% in 2025 and is "now limited to 9% of total contributions".	Delivery against target, and the core share.
Alexander de Croo	Every core dollar mobilises "roughly $10 in additional resources". 91 cents of every dollar goes to the field. 80% of core funds the strategic plan. Continued erosion risks "40% of the impact". Discretionary residual: "only 80 million".	What core buys, and how much of it UNDP can actually steer.
Netherlands	€40 million in multiannual core funding, announced from the floor.	The only new money committed in this meeting.
United States	Core funding has undergone a "71% real term collapse… since 2011", against a management tier of "two under secretaries general and nine assistant secretaries general".	The same decline, used to argue for restructuring rather than replenishment.
Zambia and Brazil	Government development financing reached "nearly $1.6 billion in 2025, representing 29% of total contributions".	What programme countries now pay into their own UNDP programmes.

Two figures for the same decline. Uruguay gives ODA at −23.3% and Rwanda at −23.1%. Uruguay's core figure (−27%) is for the UN system as a whole; Rwanda's (−24%) is for UNDP alone. The two are measuring different things and both can hold.

What programme countries now pay. The $1.6 billion figure was cited approvingly by the Administrator and pointedly by two delegations. Zambia attached a condition to it: "National ownership must not be equated with national financing", and asked that the growth be read "against limited fiscal space, rising debt burdens and competing development needs". Brazil drew the opposite inference — that a rising programme-country share is a reason to keep country offices open, not to close them.

Areas of Consensus

These hold across every camp, including between the United States and the delegations it disagrees with.

The investment model is accepted. No delegation argued that UNDP should stay with a project-based aid model. The United States endorses it from its own direction, quoting a de Croo interview that "emphasizing aid is a matter of the past". The Dominican Republic endorses it from the other: "The development model is changing and financing for development must evolve from aid to investment."
National ownership governs. Named by almost every programme country. India stated it as a rule: "solutions cannot be dictated from outside. Instead, they must be introduced by Member States and driven by their national priorities."
Reform must not shrink country capacity. The condition attached to UN80 support on all sides. El Salvador: "It cannot mean weakening the system." Nepal for the LDCs: "reforms must extend and not diminish development capacity in programme countries".
Income alone misclassifies need. Argued by small island states, middle income states and landlocked states alike. Nauru asks that the multidimensional vulnerability index sit "alongside income classifications"; Australia supports the same request; Armenia makes it for landlocked middle income countries.
South-South cooperation is a delivery channel, not a talking point. Backed with money by India ("over $150 million" across two named funds) and China (the Global Development Initiative, "over 23 billion US dollars"), and named by the Administrator as one of three pillars of the model.

Fault Lines

Four divides ran through the session. Each names its poles, who anchors them, and one quote per side. A delegation appears once here; its full position is in the reference cards.

1. Who has to move — the contributors, or UNDP?

This is the divide the meeting turned on. Both sides accept the same facts about the decline. They disagree about what follows.

Contributors must move. Dominican Republic, Rwanda, Uruguay, Bhutan, Viet Nam, India, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Ethiopia and China. Bhutan names the addressee: "We urge all Member States, particularly major contributors, to restore predictable core fundings."
UNDP must move. The United States, alone in placing the requirement there instead: "UNDP must urgently restructure its executive leadership and downside top level overhead to reflect current fiscal realities."
Both must move. Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Côte d'Ivoire, Zambia, Brazil, Nepal, Lao PDR and Bangladesh. The Netherlands does both in one statement: it pledges €40 million and then asks "what difficult choices is UNDP prepared to make to protect its core strengths?"

Where it sits. The Administrator answered the second pole without naming it, and accepted part of it: he opened the allocation formula himself and invited the Board to revisit it.

2. Can other money do core's job?

If core keeps falling, something has to absorb the work. Delegations split on whether anything can.

Nothing substitutes. Germany states it most directly: "Maintaining overall revenue through earmarked and government co-financing cannot substitute for predictable core funding." Zambia for the African Group: "Investment cannot replace ODA, concessional finance, or predictable core resources" Côte d'Ivoire asks that diversification "complement without replacing core resources".
The gap itself is the danger. Norway puts the structural version: "If the gap between core resources and earmarked resources becomes too strong, then the preference of donors risks weighing more than the mandates agreed upon by Member States." New Zealand reaches the same place from the reform side, naming "incentives created by funding arrangements that favour fragmented project delivery".
Design the mix deliberately. The Philippines for the middle income group: "a healthy funding mix built upon a strong core funding base and complemented by thematic pooled and flexible earmarked resources, each serving distinct and complementary purposes".

Where it sits. de Croo agreed with the diagnosis and gave it a mechanism: high earmarking is why MOPAN found UNDP more focused on delivery than on outcome. "If the funding is very earmarked on projects, obviously the reporting is very much on the delivery of those projects."

3. What must survive a smaller budget?

Norway asked the question directly — what gets protected and where do cuts fall. Delegations answered with their own priorities before he was answered.

Country presence. The most frequent answer. Nauru and Australia for small island states, El Salvador, Timor-Leste, Lao PDR and Brazil. New Zealand puts the principle: country and regional presence "are operational requirements, not overhead costs".
Oversight and accountability. Norway commends UNDP for "preserving the functions of oversight, accountability, and supervision during this period of budget restrictions". Germany raises a specific concern about UNDP's "announced intention to opt out of the Joint Inspection Unit system-wide review".
Technical expertise. Zambia: "efficiency should not come at the expense of country presence, technical expertise or responsiveness to national priorities".

Where it sits. de Croo named country presence first and then named what is at risk if the decline continues: "it puts at risk our policy work, it puts at risk our oversight work, it puts at risk the geographical presence that we have."

4. What does the investment model do for the countries capital avoids?

The model works by attracting private capital. Delegations from countries that private capital reaches least asked what it does for them.

The question. Zambia for the African Group asks "how UNDP will ensure that its investment-oriented approach does not disproportionately favor countries and sectors which where private capital is easiest to mobilize", and adds that the transition "must remain development-led, inclusive and additional".
The same worry from the Pacific and the LDCs. Nauru names "geographic isolation, limited capacity and exposure to external shocks". Nepal asks how the strategic plan will be implemented in LDCs "under current financing constraints".
The counter-position. The United States answers a version of it by redefining success: "UNDP's success must be measured by self-reliance achieved and private capital unlocked."

Where it sits. de Croo answered with two examples rather than a rule — a Fiji sovereign blue bond that raised €9 million, and UNDP presence in 36 small island developing states — and said catalytic financing "works everywhere in the world, also in small island developing states".

Raised by one delegation

Cuba gave the meeting's most detailed account of blocked delivery, attributing it to United States sanctions: "a dozen UNDP containers are being held in ports across the region", including medical supplies, "over 16,000 rechargeable lamps" and shelter modules, with up to 60% of container traffic to Cuba affected.
Germany asked UNDP to explain its intention to opt out of the Joint Inspection Unit review on financing challenges, and announced €10 million for the UN Palestine Recovery Trust Fund.
Nauru raised government contributions to local office costs (GLOC) as a live financial question for small states, asking that changes be agreed with the government and that vulnerability sit alongside income in waiver decisions. Australia supported both points.
Brazil asked that the Office for South-South Cooperation receive its full projected resources, which are "considerably less than last year's", and asked for the criteria that will guide any change in country presence.
Bangladesh asked for predictable phased support through its requested three-year extension of the LDC graduation preparatory period.
Myanmar argued that delivery depends on partner choice rather than funding volume, crediting local partners with rebuilding after airstrikes and restoring services after blocked humanitarian access.

Open questions to pick up next round The meeting ran out of time. The President closed with roughly ten delegations still waiting: "We have about 10 more statements, and of course, the administrator will have the chance to react to the remaining statements." Because the second reply round never happened, the questions asked after the Administrator's single reply were not answered in the room. That includes the Netherlands on where UNDP will prioritise and which difficult choices it will make, Papua New Guinea on the integrator role, and Germany's Joint Inspection Unit question, which was asked before the reply and not addressed in it.

Fault-Line Plot — Cluster Map

How to read this plot

Left → rightHow much a delegation put on the record about the funding constraint, counted from verbatim quotes. Arguing at length that UNDP should restructure sits on the right too.

Up / downWhich side it argued for. This is where direction lives.

ColourWhich camp a delegation belongs to.

Click a dotSee both rubrics behind the score; click a second to compare.

The right-hand column holds the delegations that argued the funding question at length, in both directions. The United States sits there alone on the bottom row, arguing that UNDP must restructure; the Dominican Republic, Rwanda and Uruguay sit there on the top row, arguing that contributors must restore core. On the "who has to move" axis the bottom row is the interesting one: it puts the United States alongside Finland, France, Japan, Sweden and the United Kingdom — all core contributors, all placing their ask on UNDP rather than on other states, and arriving there by opposite routes. Switch to the second axis and the same pairing sharpens: the Netherlands and the United States share the bottom-right cell, both arguing at length about how UNDP should work. One announces €40 million of new core funding in the same breath; the other names no contribution at all.

Each delegation is scored on two rubrics of seven indicators — one for the case that contributors must restore core funding, one for the case that UNDP's own structure is the constraint — and the horizontal position is the two added together. Dots are rank-spaced within a cell, never jittered. The Administrator is unscored and sits in his own band below the dashed line: he authored the proposal the axis measures reactions to. No delegation spoke below the brevity threshold, so no brief chip appears. Positions reflect the 26 August 2026 meeting only. Rubrics and caveats.

Y axis — fault-line dimension

Breakdown comparison — click dots to fill the two slots

Every quote is verbatim from the automatic-speech-recognition transcript. Grey parenthetical rows are analyst summaries of absence, not quotes. Scores are ordinal evidence tallies, not measurements. The ⇆ marker shows which delegation the next dot-click will replace — click the other slot's ⇆ to swap that one instead.

Scores at a Glance

Every scored delegation, ordered by how far its argument sits from neutral. On record is the total put on the record either way, and is what the plot's horizontal axis shows. For is the case that contributors must restore core funding; against is the case that UNDP's own structure is the constraint to fix first.

Scored delegations — 37 of 39 speakers. The Administrator presents the proposal being judged and is not scored; the President is procedural.
#	Delegation	On record	For	Against	Net	What they argued

Tracked Figures

This track follows a small number of load-bearing figures across meetings, and reports whether the room comes back to them. A figure is tracked when a reader would want to know, going into the next session, whether anyone answers it.

Figure 1 Answered this round

At the 2nd meeting on 24 August, UNDP's Chief Financial Officer George Kuriakou opened the core budget to answer a question about priorities. The 2026 core programme budget is $321 million, of which $130 million was collected. Of that, $170 million is fixed by Board resolution under a "predetermined formula", leaving $85.4 million of management discretion plus $24.1 million for crises. His conclusion: "when we have a level in 2025, 9% of our funding is core, that doesn't mean 9% is subject to management discretion."

Why it is tracked. It changes what the core-funding argument is about. A reader who knows only that core is 9% will assume the organisation can steer that 9%. On these figures, roughly a quarter of it is actually steerable.

Reactions by meeting
Meeting	Reaction	Who
2nd meeting, 24 Aug 2026	Planted	George Kuriakou, UNDP Chief Financial Officer
3rd meeting, 25 Aug 2026	No reaction. No delegation cited the figures and none argued the discretion question.	—
5th meeting, 26 Aug 2026	Answered, without the numbers. Two speakers argued the discretion question directly. Neither cited Kuriakou's figures.	United States; Alexander de Croo, UNDP Administrator

The United States argued the formula is the problem: "resource allocation formulas must be modernized. We must revise the methodology so core funding prioritizes low-income, fragile, and least developed countries where it is needed most." de Croo reached the same subject from inside, giving his own discretionary residual and proposing the Board reopen the formula (the passage in full is in Talking Points). Note the two figures. Kuriakou gave $85.4 million of management discretion plus $24.1 million for crises on 24 August; de Croo gives "only 80 million" on 26 August. Both describe the same residual. Neither speaker stated a basis for the difference, so both figures stand as spoken and are not reconciled here. The figure stays tracked: the Board discussion de Croo proposes has not happened.

Figure 2 No reaction this round

At the 3rd meeting on 25 August, UNOPS Executive Director Jorge Moreira da Silva said the two agencies' five merger options do not agree with one another on the money: "Those five options that we have densified in the report may have differences on the numbers, on the cost effectiveness, the cost benefit, and on the transitions. So reconciliation will be needed on the numbers."

Why it is tracked. It is the agencies confirming the factual claim the United States built its refusal on — that the Board is being asked to fund a consultancy to reconcile divergent data. Whether the independent assessment actually reconciles those numbers is the question the next rounds should answer.

Reactions by meeting
Meeting	Reaction	Who
3rd meeting, 25 Aug 2026	Planted	Jorge Moreira da Silva, UNOPS Executive Director
5th meeting, 26 Aug 2026	No reaction. Three delegations raised the UNDP–UNOPS process. None asked whether the numbers had been reconciled.	—

The United Kingdom "appreciate the joint terms of reference for the independent assessment and urge continued momentum in assessing proposals". The Netherlands encourages the agencies "to move forward swiftly with the agreed process on potential merger". France says it endorses "the results of the evaluation that was conducted". All three press for the assessment to proceed; none returns to the concession made the day before. The agenda explains part of it — this was the UNDP segment, not the UN80 segment — but the delegations that raised the merger had the floor to raise the concession too. An unanswered figure is recorded here rather than dropped.

Talking Points

The verbatim record of the quotes the analysis rests on.

“There is one constraint which we cannot reform our way around, and that is funding. I want to be clear. We cannot keep absorbing the decline in core funding without eroding what you rely on from us. Our ability to act early, our ability to innovate, our ability to build partnerships that unlock far bigger volumes of investment. Core funding is not simply a contribution. It is catalytic capital for development.”
— Alexander de Croo
, UNDP Administrator, opening statement

“Every core dollar is mobilizing roughly $10 in additional resources. Core funding lets us stay present when conditions deteriorate, work in those places where the risks are the highest, invest early when crises grow in a very costly way, and turn isolated projects into portfolios with a real impact. Core is the platform that lets us deliver. But that cuts both ways. If the decline in core continues, that platform will start to crumble, and we risk losing as much as 40% of the impact that we have today on the people for whom we deliver.”
— Alexander de Croo
, UNDP Administrator, opening statement

“So my appeal to this board is very simple. Protect that foundation on which we work. Protect that foundation on which so much of development work is being based. protect the flexible, predictable resources that allow UNDP to act early, to innovate, and to deliver.”
— Alexander de Croo
, UNDP Administrator, closing the opening statement

“And our appeal really is to prioritize core. We understand that asking for more funding is difficult in these circumstances. So the real message is, if you cannot do more, please do core. and increase your core funding in the total, because the impact of core funding on the other projects is really huge one, and it helps us to mobilize other type of financing.”
— Alexander de Croo
, UNDP Administrator, reply round

“Of course, the way core is allocated is based on a formula which is approved by the board. And so if we respect the priorities put in that formula, there is only 80 million which is left, which is based on our own discretionary decisions that we can take. So at some point, we might have to have a discussion again in this board on the allocation formula, because this allocation formula dates from a time when core was in a bigger volume.”
— Alexander de Croo
, UNDP Administrator, answering Norway on which functions get protected

“you should know that if we want today to compensate for the erosion of core by increasing the cost recovery, that would mean that you would have to double the cost recovery. This could be part of the solution, but doubling cost recovery, I'm not sure this is the direction we want to go.”
— Alexander de Croo
, UNDP Administrator, on whether cost recovery can fill the gap

“Structurally, UNDP remains overly top heavy, maintaining a management tier of two under secretaries general and nine assistant secretaries general. despite the 71% real term collapse in core funding since 2011 and the removal of the resident coordinator system. This heavy executive architecture is financially unsustainable. UNDP must urgently restructure its executive leadership and downside top level overhead to reflect current fiscal realities.”
— United States

“OPEN also correctly underscores that resource allocation formulas must be modernized. We must revise the methodology so core funding prioritizes low-income, fragile, and least developed countries where it is needed most.”
— United States

“And all states, without exception, should stop the drop in core funding. Not doing this, as you reminded, means losing up to 40% of the impact that we have created together. And the response that we need is not whether the world needs a new development model, but whether we can allow ourselves not to build it.”
— Dominican Republic

“Core funding now represents less than one-tenth of UNDP's overall resources, far below the ambitions set under the funding compact. For Rwanda, this raises a fundamental question about the development model we collectively expect UNDP to sustain.”
— Rwanda

“However, efficiency cannot substitute for adequate financing, nor can reform become a means of managing an ever-smaller development pillar.”
— Rwanda

“we are pleased to announce that the Netherlands will provide 40 million euros in multiannual core funding to UNDP for the coming years. So predictable core funding resources are essential for UNDP to deliver effectively, maintain oversight and preserve strategic flexibility.”
— Netherlands

“Maintaining overall revenue through earmarked and government co-financing cannot substitute for predictable core funding. Core resources are essential for UNDP's integrator role for accountability and oversight and for acting early in crises. And that's why Germany increased its core contribution despite severe budget constraints.”
— Germany

“depending or increasing dependency with regard to financing earmarked for projects or purposes that are specific risks undermining the setting of strategic priorities. Definitely organizations are implementing the things for which they have received financing. If the gap between core resources and earmarked resources becomes too strong, then the preference of donors risks weighing more than the mandates agreed upon by Member States.”
— Norway

“Finally, if the current financial trends continue, Norway would like to have more information about the priorities and the arbitrations that the UNDP has envisaged. What functions and what areas of activity need to be protected and where will cuts become inevitable?”
— Norway

“The group reiterates its longstanding call for a significant increase in core contributions, Urging all development partners to reverse the current trajectory by providing adequate, predictable and flexible funding, which is indispensable to achieving the objectives of the UNDP strategic plan.”
— Uruguay
, for the Group of 77 and China

“The Africa Group takes note of the shift from aid towards investment and agrees that development resources should help unlock financing at scale. However, this transition must remain development-led, inclusive and additional. Investment cannot replace ODA, concessional finance, or predictable core resources, particularly for African countries, LDCs, fragile and conflict-affected countries, and other structurally constrained economies.”
— Zambia
, for the Africa Group

“We would welcome greater clarity on how UNDP will ensure that its investment-oriented approach does not disproportionately favor countries and sectors which where private capital is easiest to mobilize.”
— Zambia
, for the Africa Group — answered by example rather than by rule

“And on that note, let me end with a call on all partners to do their part to support the work of UNDP at the country level, including in Vietnam. And I'd go beyond what the administrator just said and would ask partners to contribute more and contribute core, just as Vietnam has been doing in the most recent years.”
— Viet Nam

“Finally, we share the Administrator's concern over the erosion of core resources. Flexible core funding is exactly what allowed UNDP to respond to Bhutan's specific priorities rather than a one-size-fits-all model. We urge all Member States, particularly major contributors, to restore predictable core fundings so UNDP can keep.”
— Bhutan

“The financial outlook requires strategic prioritization and difficult choices. UNDP has a broad mandate, but it cannot do everything everywhere… So we'd like to ask, where do you see the greatest scope for prioritization and what difficult choices is UNDP prepared to make to protect its core strengths?”
— Netherlands
— asked after the reply round; the meeting closed before a second reply

“We are nevertheless concerned by a drop of 24% in core resources in 2025, which is now limited to 9% of total contributions… In this financial context that is characterized by a drop in financing, what measures do you envision to preserve your presence in country as well as technical capacities and oversight and accountability functions without reducing its support to developing countries?”
— Cote d'Ivoire

“Therefore, the United States is preventing the arrival of vital resources for the well-being of our population and is reinforcing the collective punishment meted out against my country.”
— Cuba
, on UNDP shipments held in regional ports

“we remain concerned about UNDP's announced intention to opt out of the Joint Inspection Unit system-wide review on challenges in financing and given UNDP's central role in the UN development system, full cooperation with agreed oversight to our mind is essential.”
— Germany
— not addressed in the reply round

“We will close the conversation here. I want to thank the interpreters for agreeing to continue beyond the agreed schedule… We have about 10 more statements, and of course, the administrator will have the chance to react to the remaining statements.”
— UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS Executive Board
, closing the meeting with the speakers' list unfinished

Reference: Stances by Delegation

Showing 38 of 38

Dominican Republic

Contributors must restore core

Makes the meeting’s strongest general ask: "all states, without exception, should stop the drop in core funding". Reads the new model back to the Administrator as its own experience — "The development model is changing and financing for development must evolve from aid to investment" — and describes the relationship as one where "We do not see UNDP as an assistance provider, but rather a partner that provides technical intelligence". Cites the 40% impact figure back to him and closes on the choice: "the response that we need is not whether the world needs a new development model, but whether we can allow ourselves not to build it".

Rwanda

Contributors must restore core

Puts figures on the decline: ODA down "23.1% in 2025, noted as the largest fall on record", UNDP core down 24%, and core now "less than one-tenth of UNDP’s overall resources, far below the ambitions set under the funding compact". Argues the limit of reform — "efficiency cannot substitute for adequate financing, nor can reform become a means of managing an ever-smaller development pillar" — and lists the functions core pays for. Asks whether non-core could contribute more to sustaining core capacities.

Uruguay

Contributors must restore core — G77 and China

For the Group of 77 and China. Brings the system-wide figures: ODA down 23.3% in 2025 with a further 6.9% projected, core contributions to the UN system down 27%, "the largest annual decline on record", and 32 contributing member states. Urges "all development partners to reverse the current trajectory". Ties the ask to the Sevilla commitments, concessional finance, debt measures and the removal of unilateral coercive measures. Welcomes efficiency work under UN80 without setting it against core.

Bhutan

Contributors must restore core

Names the addressee directly: "We urge all Member States, particularly major contributors, to restore predictable core fundings". Argues from 50 years of partnership that flexible core is what bought tailoring — core funding "is exactly what allowed UNDP to respond to Bhutan’s specific priorities rather than a one-size-fits-all model" — and asks the Board not to treat LDC graduation as a reason to withdraw: "Graduation is a beginning, not an end."

Netherlands

Contributors must restore core

The only new money in the meeting: "the Netherlands will provide 40 million euros in multiannual core funding to UNDP for the coming years", announced as a direct response — "we heard you, Mr Administrator". Pairs the pledge with the meeting’s firmest prioritisation challenge: "UNDP has a broad mandate, but it cannot do everything everywhere", and asks "what difficult choices is UNDP prepared to make to protect its core strengths?" Names governance, rule of law, conflict prevention and resilient institutions as where it sees the added value.

Germany

Contributors must restore core

States the substitution argument most cleanly: "Maintaining overall revenue through earmarked and government co-financing cannot substitute for predictable core funding", and backs it with its own act — Germany "increased its core contribution despite severe budget constraints". Announces €10 million for the UN Palestine Recovery Trust Fund. Raises two oversight questions: how UNDP will use the MOPAN findings on results-based management, and why it intends to opt out of the Joint Inspection Unit review on financing.

Côte d’Ivoire

Contributors must restore core

Brings delivery figures alongside the decline: UNDP mobilised "$9.6 billion between 2022 and 2025, around 91% of estimated contributions", while core fell 24% to 9% of total contributions. Argues that diversification into IFIs, private and philanthropic finance "should complement without replacing core resources, which are indispensable for the neutrality, flexibility, and institutional capacity of the program". Asks what measures will preserve country presence, technical capacity and oversight under the constraint.

Viet Nam

Contributors must restore core

The one delegation to say the Administrator’s ask is too modest: "I’d go beyond what the administrator just said and would ask partners to contribute more and contribute core, just as Vietnam has been doing in the most recent years." Speaks from a live transition — newly classified upper middle income, with "more constrained access to concessional financing" — and confirms the Administrator’s own Viet Nam example of catalytic support unlocking a green transition.

India

Contributors must restore core

Defends UNDP against restructuring in one line: "we must not try to fix something that isn’t broke". Names its own money — "over $150 million" through the India UN Development Partnership Fund and the IBSA Fund, focused on LDCs and SIDS — and confirms it is "a consistent core contributor", encouraging others to do the same. Argues national ownership as a rule: "solutions cannot be dictated from outside. Instead, they must be introduced by Member States and driven by their national priorities".

Zambia

Contributors must restore core — Africa Group

For the Africa Group. Accepts the shift to investment and puts two conditions on it: the transition "must remain development-led, inclusive and additional", and "Investment cannot replace ODA, concessional finance, or predictable core resources". Asks the question the model has to answer — how UNDP will stop the investment approach favouring "countries and sectors which where private capital is easiest to mobilize". On the $1.6 billion of government development financing, warns that "National ownership must not be equated with national financing".

Norway

Contributors must restore core

Makes the structural case against earmarking: "If the gap between core resources and earmarked resources becomes too strong, then the preference of donors risks weighing more than the mandates agreed upon by Member States." Notes core is "now less than 10% of total contributions" and commends UNDP for protecting oversight and accountability under constraint. Asks the question the Administrator answered with the allocation formula: which functions get protected, "and where will cuts become inevitable?"

Nepal

Protect country presence — LDC group

For the least developed countries. Concerned that the decline in flexible and core resources "could weaken support at a time when LDCs require greater assistance". Sets five asks: the Doha Programme of Action and its midterm review, productive capacity and graduation, resilience and early warning, sustainable finance and debt-sensitive planning, and digital and statistical capacity. Frames the reform test plainly — "reforms must extend and not diminish development capacity in programme countries". Spoke also in national capacity on the Nepal floods.

Ethiopia

Contributors must restore core

Argues that money alone will not do it: "Adequate funding is not going to be enough if UNDP has limited flexibility. Business as usual is no longer sufficient." Names decreasing core funding as a risk to resilience in LDCs and calls for collective work "to find practical and innovative solutions to broaden and strengthen UNDP’s core funding base". Puts the open question directly: "Now the question is whether mobilizing domestic resources is the only way out."

Brazil

Contributors must restore core

Reads the rising programme-country share as an argument for keeping offices open: government development financing at 29% of total resources "strongly suggests the need to maintain and where appropriate strengthen the program’s presence in traditional program countries". Notes it was "among the top 20 contributors to NDP’s overall resources in 2025". Asks for the criteria that will guide any change in country presence, and for the Office for South-South Cooperation to receive its full projected resources.

Thailand

Contributors must restore core

Speaks as one of the 32 core contributors and commits to continue: "Thailand remains committed to doing our part and encourages others to contribute to this effort." Six decades of partnership behind it. Commends private-sector and climate-fund mobilisation as complements rather than replacements, noting its own country programme expects a significant share from green and climate funds. Joins as an incoming Board member.

Philippines

Protect country presence — middle income group

For the like-minded group of middle income countries, 19 states. Sets out the funding architecture it wants: "a healthy funding mix built upon a strong core funding base and complemented by thematic pooled and flexible earmarked resources, each serving distinct and complementary purposes". Presses two priorities — a system-wide response plan for middle income countries and a strategic plan of action — and warns that "rationalization should not result in standardized approaches that may affect country engagement".

Lao PDR

Protect country presence

Values country presence, responsiveness and the ability "to connect global expertise with national needs". Welcomes its country programme for 2027–2031, aligned to the tenth national plan and the LDC transition strategy, and names unexploded ordnance among its persistent constraints. On funding: "Continued support and contribution to core and MTDG resources will be essential for UNDP to maintain its operational capacity and deliver effectively at country level."

Bangladesh

Contributors must restore core

Asks for more than restoration: "We share your view and reiterate the importance of enhanced core funding to enable UNDP to act, to innovate, and to stay in crisis situation". Details a post-election agenda — the ballot project, parliamentary orientation, social protection, climate finance access — and asks UNDP to consolidate into "fewer demand driven and high impact programs". Seeks predictable phased support through its requested three-year extension of the LDC graduation preparatory period.

Pakistan

Contributors must restore core

Confirms the model from its own experience — the special investment facilitation council, its own SDG investor map — while naming the gap: "challenges remain in translating such tools into actual investments on the ground". Calls for reversing the core decline "as it remains the foundation of UNDP’s ability to act flexibly and impartially", and insists domestic effort must be matched by "the fulfilment of long-standing ODA and climate finance commitments". Sets one test for reform: whether it improves country-level delivery.

Sri Lanka

Contributors must restore core

Names the actor that has to move: "We call for the development partners to provide adequate and predictable funding to achieve the objectives UNDP champions for." Notes with concern the decline in ODA and co-contributions. Asks that reform be "member state-led, transparent, evidence-based", and that the development gains programme countries have won be acknowledged rather than treated as a reason to step back.

Cuba

Protect country presence

Gives the meeting’s most detailed account of blocked delivery, attributed to United States sanctions: "a dozen UNDP containers are being held in ports across the region", including medical supplies, "over 16,000 rechargeable lamps, 5,000 tarps to replenish our humanitarian reserves, over 1,500 mattresses and structures for 560 modules", with up to 60% of container traffic affected. Values UNDP work on the energy mix, water and health, and asks that it be given "sufficient, predictable and sustainable resources".

United Kingdom

Contributors must restore core

Names itself "a contributor to UNDP’s core funding, providing predictable, reliable finance", then puts its asks on UNDP: focus on comparative advantages, engage the wider financial system, and deliver "measurable results where it can at the greatest value". Supports the UN80 ambition and wants progress on country team reconfiguration, shared services, technology and data. Appreciates the joint terms of reference for the UNDP–UNOPS assessment and urges continued momentum.

Sweden

Contributors must restore core

States the consequence without making an ask of other states: "maintaining long-term institutional capacity will become increasingly difficult if the decline in flexible and predictable funding continues". Wants the reform to be measurable — member states need "clear information on the concrete results delivered through the UNAT process, including how efficiencies and cost savings will be measured, monitored and reported". Names Ukraine, Gaza and Syria as where Swedish-funded work has held up, and thanks staff transferred to new duty stations.

New Zealand

Protect country presence

Reaches the funding argument through reform, naming "incentives created by funding arrangements that favour fragmented project delivery" as the constraint on integrated results. Puts the presence argument in its firmest form: country and regional presence "are operational requirements, not overhead costs". Supports the UN80 initiative and a strong resident coordinator system, and asks that reform proposals be assessed holistically rather than piece by piece.

Nauru

Protect country presence

Brings the meeting’s most operational financial ask. On government contributions towards local office costs, it asks that any change "should be discussed directly with and agreed by the government", and that "the UN MVI be considered alongside income classifications when assessing a country’s ability to contribute and when determining applicable GLOC waivers". Argues that income alone "does not adequately reflect narrow economic base and high service delivery costs faced by SEEDS". Answered by the Administrator on presence in 36 small island states.

Armenia

Protect country presence

Argues that classification by income misreads vulnerability for landlocked and middle income states: many "face development challenges that are not fully captured by classifications based on GDP per capita, including limited fiscal space, exposure to shocks, infrastructure gaps". Notes UNDP’s 2025 financial results and continued growth in programme expenses as evidence of demand. Asks that UN80 efficiency work "ultimately strengthen rather than distract from mandate delivery".

Finland

Make the capital model work

Engages the investment half of the proposal and funds an instrument in it: "Finland continues to support the OECD UNDP Tax Inspectors Without Borders initiative", which shows how "relatively modest investments in strengthened capacity of tax administrations can catalyse substantial and sustainable domestic revenues". Argues UNDP is "uniquely positioned to embed tax cooperation within broader governance, public finance and institutional reforms", citing results in Africa and Ukraine. Does not address the core decline.

Australia

Protect country presence

Welcomes the MOPAN assessment and asks UNDP to address why strong delivery does not always translate into lasting progress. Presses on Pacific presence and on consultation: "Member States should be consulted on significant organisational changes that may affect country presence, service delivery or development outcomes." Supports Nauru’s request that the multidimensional vulnerability index be used alongside income when calculating local office costs and waivers.

China

Contributors must restore core

The one delegation to name a category of contributor: "We hope UNDP will further strengthen dialogue with traditional donors and encourage developed countries to effectively fulfill their development financing commitments." Notes the significant decline in core resources in 2025. Reports its Global Development Initiative at "over 23 billion US dollars in funding and implemented over 1,800 cooperation projects" — its own bilateral channel rather than a UNDP contribution. Backs South-South cooperation and internal reform.

Timor-Leste

Protect country presence

Argues durability comes from national systems: "The durability of progress ultimately depends on the development that’s led, shaped, and sustained by national systems." Welcomes its country programme for 2026–2030 and asks UNDP to deepen support for agriculture, fisheries, tourism, entrepreneurship and skills, with youth employment as the named gap. Wants capacity building to emphasise knowledge transfer and institutional ownership. Does not address the funding decline.

El Salvador

Protect country presence

Sets the clearest condition on reform: "in the context of UNAD, we want to be very clear. It cannot mean weakening the system. Any kind of institutional adjustment should preserve operational capacity, specialized knowledge, and above all, the presence of UNDP on the ground." Names concrete work — a judicial-branch memorandum of understanding, the Trifinio water governance programme, Digital Agro Energy — and thanks UNDP for support to its co-presidency of the first Global Dialogue on AI Governance.

Papua New Guinea

Protect country presence

Delivered a truncated statement and undertook to submit the full text. Names peacebuilding, women’s leadership, renewable energy access and locally led climate action as where UNDP delivers, plus support for the reset agenda, customary land reform and a joint electoral security programme for next year’s elections. Argues that "greater efficiency and institutional reform should translate into stronger delivery at the country level", and asks how the Administrator intends to strengthen the integrator role.

Ukraine

Protect country presence

Gives the meeting’s most quantified delivery account: UNDP "has procured or is procuring energy equipment with a combined capacity of more than 600 megawatts", which it puts in scale as "roughly the yearly capacity of one of our major hydropower plants". Names the donors that funded it and calls on other states "to join this circle of friends". Invites the Administrator to visit. Does not address the core decline.

Myanmar

Protect country presence

Argues delivery depends on partner choice rather than funding volume: "effective deliverable by the UNDP are contingent upon choosing the right partnership and working with relevant stakeholders." Evidences it with what local partners did — rebuilding homes and schools after airstrikes, building shelters in displacement camps, restoring services after humanitarian access was blocked. Asks UNDP to reinforce the humanitarian–development–peace nexus as the response to the conflict’s root causes.

Japan

Make the capital model work

Engages the catalytic role and asks UNDP to strengthen it "by building enabling environments, de-risking private investment, and connecting business solutions with needs on the ground". Frames the value test at project level: "the value of UNDP’s work as a whole ultimately rests on the quality and results of individual projects it delivers on the ground", with transparency and efficient project management more important under constraint. Welcomes the Moving Beyond Crisis vision. Does not name core.

France

Make the capital model work

Supports UNDP’s role in crisis and early action, naming Ukraine, Lebanon and Syria. Frames the financing question as a balance to strike rather than a level to restore: "We need to rethink the logic of financing while maintaining the logic of solidarity. This is a delicate balance we must strike." Puts partnership, investment and capital mobilisation at the centre of its G7 approach. Encourages ambition on the UNOPS work and endorses the evaluation results. Does not address the core decline.

United States of America

Fix UNDP’s structure first

The only delegation to place the constraint on UNDP rather than on contributors, and the only one to name no contribution. Endorses the investment model by quoting the Administrator back — "emphasizing aid is a matter of the past" — and sets the success test as "self-reliance achieved and private capital unlocked". Argues the organisation is "overly top heavy" at two USGs and nine ASGs against a "71% real term collapse in core funding since 2011", and that it "must urgently restructure its executive leadership". Asks that allocation formulas be modernised so core reaches low-income, fragile and least developed countries, and calls for spending controls, an end to business class travel and the elimination of diversity, equity and inclusion programmes.

Alexander de Croo — UNDP

Presenter — not scored

Presenter, not a delegation. Sets out the new development model — raise more, borrow better, share what works — and argues core funding is the platform that makes it possible. Author of the proposal the axis measures reactions to, so he is left unscored.